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Technology  - Balance of payments 1.  INTER-COMPANY  HOLDINGS 
1.1  American Holdings  in European Firms 
As  in all other branches  of the  economy,  the  United States 
are represented in the  various European aerospace  industries 
through holdings  in the  capital of a  number  of companies. 
The  table  on  the  following  page  (Fig.  1)  summarizes  existing 
holdings and reveals  the  following  main  features: 
(a)  the  number  of such holdings is limited; 
(b)  they are  certainly or probably linked with the 
sharing of technical knowledge. 
Although  few  in number,  these holdings are significant  for 
two  reasons: 
(a)  the  role  of the  European  companies  involved; 
(b)  the  transfer of  technological knowhow  enables  the 
assignor to  join the benefiting company,  even if 
only as  a  minority shareholder. 
This  being so,  it would  appear reasonable  to exclude  any 
purely financial motive  on  the  part of the  investor. 
Another  case  of participation,  which  does  not  appear in the 
table  because it is very recent,  is the  formation  (in December 
1960)  of the  subsidiary Cobelda  of SABCA  (B),  with SABCA  itself 
and  the  American  firm  of Hughes  Aircraft  Co.,  each holding 50% 
of the  shares.  In 1969,  when  SABCA  bought  up  all the Hughes 
shares,  Cobelda  became  the  electronics division of SABCA. 
903 FIG.  1 
Capital Holdings  of American  Aerospace Firms in EEC  Aerospace Firms 
EEC  firms 
SNECMA  (F) 
REIMS  AVIATICX'l  (F) 
AERMACCH I  ( I ) 
BOLKOW  (G) 
VFW  (GJ 
FOKKER  (NL) 
Participating  Capital holding 
American  firms 
Pratt. & Whitney  (now  di- 11.9% 
vision of United Aircraft) 
since  1959 
~S~A, since 1960 
Lockheed,  since  1959 
Boeing, since  1965 
United Aircraft 
Republic  Aviation Glow  di 
~sion of  Fairchild Hil-
ler) until. 1965 
Northrop  since 1965 
49.0% 
20.0% 
25%,  reduced in 1969 
to 9.7%  of the  cap-
ital of the  new  com· 
pany Messerschmitt-
Btslkow-Blohm 
26.37% 
904 
Transactions asso-
ciated with  capital 
holding 
IUicence  agreement for 
turbofan  TF  30 
~icence agreement 
for  the  constructioi 
of aircraft designee 
~y Cessna,  for sale 
in Europe,  Africa 
~nd Asia 
Licence  agreement ex-
clusively for  the 
construction,  outsice 
the United States, 
of the 
Lockheed  60  (AL  60) 
Start of  EWR/Boeing 
studies for  the 
military aircraft 
VJ  101 1.2Holdings of European Firms in Other European Firms 
The  Community  can also show  examples  of aerospace  firms  with 
holdings  in their counterparts in other countries.  Under  the 
terms  of cooperation agreements  with B5lkow  (West  Germany), 
Nord-Aviation  (F)  obtained a  25%  holding in B5lkow  in 1965; 
a  year later,  in 1966,  the  two  companies  set up  the  UVP  (Joint 
company  for  the sale of B5lkow-Nord  Aviation products),  which 
uses  the sales networks  of the  constituent  firms. 
The  formation  (1969)  of the  new  Messerschmitt-B5lkow-Blohm 
Company,  subsequently reduced Nord-Aviation•s·holding to 9.?%. 
In December  1966,  Fokker  (Netherlands)  purchased  93%  of the 
shares  of SABCA  (Belgium).  Later  (January 1969),  under  the 
terms  of cooperation agreements  between Fokker and Dassault 
(France),  about  50%  of the  SABCA  shares  was  taken  over by 
Dassault,  after SABCA's  capital had been increased by  100%. 
Apart  from  these  share  transactions and the  regrouping of aero-
space  firms  in progress in a  number  of countries  (France  and 
Germany),  mention  should also be  made  of the recent  formation 
of the  company  known  as  the  "Zentralgesellschaft VFW/Fokker 
GmbH,  by  Fokker  and  VFW  (Germany). 
These  developments,  and in particular the  move  made  by  Fokker 
and  VFW,  may  be  positive steps towards  reestablishing the 
Community  aerospace  industry  on  a  basis ensuring higher pro-
duction and increased efficiency. 
2.  TECHNOCAL  PAYMENTS 
2.1  Introduction 
The  term  "balance  of payments" is taken to mean  payments  made 
or received by  one  country for  the  purchase  or sale of patents, 
905 construction licences and  technical assistance  (knowhow). 
The  use  of the  expression  "balance  of payments"  indicates 
that it does  not  include  overall international movements  and 
exchanges  of scientific and  technological  knowledge.  Such 
international exchanges  have  increased substantially since 
the  Second  World  War,  as  trade  in goods  and service has  grown, 
and it would  be  of the greatest value  to have  separate  figures 
for  such  exchanges,  partly as  a  means  of calculating the approx-
imate  extent to  which  the various  branches  of industry in one 
country are  technologically dependent  on  other countries and 
partly as  a  guide,  however  limited and  rudimentary,  to the 
productivity of industrial research1• 
Any  such balance  sheet of scientific and  technological  "trade" 
would  therefore  have  to  cover all transfers of the  findings  of 
all stages  of scientific research,  from  basic research to  de-
velopment;  in other words it would  have  to include: 
- scientific theories,  hypotheses  and  new  experiments 
concerning  "basic research"; 
- the  "applied research" inventions still awaiting 
development; 
- the  detailed development  of such inventions and 
studies leading to the  industrial application of 
new  products and processes,  under  the  heading 
"development research". 
1  Cf.  here  and  for  following  pages,  "La  bilancia italiana 
dei pagamenti  tecnologioi del 1963"  in Ricerca Scienti-
fica  e  sviluppo  economico",  CNEN/CNR,  Rome,  1968. 
906 Apart  from  the difficulty of recording statistically the 
interchange  of the  findings  of "basic research" and  some  of 
the results of ''applied research",  it must  be  borne  in mind 
that some  research findings,  which  by  their nature  could  form 
the  subject of commercial  transactions,  are  handed  over free 
of charge  or are not  transferred by direct sale,  so that they 
are not  accounted  for in the  overall balance  of payments. 
Here it should be  noted that transfers of all kinds  of research 
findings  from  country to  country  can  be  subdivided as  follows: 
- transfers free  of charge,  comprising: 
(a)  transfers of purely scientific discoveries 
which are not protected by  law; 
(b)  transfers of technical processes,  which are 
originally protected by  law but later become 
public property; 
(c)  transfers of inventions  which are protected on 
national territory but are  offered to other coun-
tries as  a  gift (e.g.,  technical assistance to 
underdeveloped countries); 
- transfers against payment,  comprising: 
(a)  transfers not  reported to government  departments 
(e.g.,  exchanges  of patents between associated 
companies  in different  countries;  the  direct ex-
change  of  technological knowledge  between large 
industrial undertakings;  exchanges  between a 
parent  company  and its foreign subsidiaries); 
(b)  transfers of scientific and  technological knowledge, 
linked with the  investment  of capital,  the  provision 
of services,  or other financial  transactions,  from 
or to foreign  countries; 
907 (c)  transfers through a  direct  commercial  transaction. 
In practice,  therefore,  only  the  results of applied research 
and  development  research which  form  the  subject of a  direct 
commercial  transaction  (transfers against  payment,  heading  c) 
can be  included in the  balance  sheet of payments  for  knowhow. 
2.2 Technological Balance  of Payments  in the Aircraft  Industry 
It is only in recent years  that  government  financial and 
statistical services in the various countries have  compiled 
and published separate  figures,  by  branches  and  countries,  for 
payments relating to transfers of  knowhow  and  have  also tried 
to bring  them into line with  the  recommendations  of the  OECD, 
which are  aimed at the  production of uniform  and,  therefore, 
comparable  statistics. 
Before  giving the  few  figures  available  for  the aircraft in-
dustry, it would  be  as  well to refer again to  what  is sai1 in 
Section 2.1  above  regarding  the  limited extent to which  trans-
fers  can  be  recorded,  particularly because,  in the  branch 
under  consideration,  the  figures available  take  no  account  of 
movements  which are either not  reflected,  or not  immediately 
reflected,  in the  financial returns.  This applies in particular 
to: 
- the  delivery of licences in return for  a  capital holding. 
This  form  of payment  is very  frequent  between  companies  of 
various sizes and is often  combined  with  the  payment  of 
royalties; 
- the  delivery of  "feed-back" licences and  "cross-licensing", 
involving a  return payment  in kind  (research or development 
carried out  by  the  licensee)  even  though  the  transaction 
may  involve  a  financial settlement; 
908 - the provision of  technical assistance  (knowhow)  to  the 
purchasing  firm  by  technicians and scientists from  the 
supplyins firm;  such services are  valued in the national 
currency of the purchasing  firm and  therefore involve  no 
movement  of  funds  which  can be  recorded by  the authorities 
concerned. 
France 
France is the  only country in Europe  with  even limited series 
of figures  for the  items  making  up  the aircraft industry's 
technological balance  of payments,  broken  down  by  country. 
Figs.  2-7  show: 
(a)  that there  was  a  surplus in 1964  and 1965  and a  deficit 
in 1966; 
(b)  that technical assistance is the  biggest  item in both 
expenditure  and  income,  and  therefore  in the  composition 
of the  balance sheet; 
(c)  that there  was  a  constant,  slight deficit with the United 
States,  resulting from  expenditure  and  income  which  were 
in the  main  lower  than  the  figures  for other countries 
(Germany,  United Kingdom); 
(d)  that movements,  and  therefore  balances,  were  biggest with 
Germany  and easily ahead  of the  figures  for  the other 
EEC  countries,  at least during the  three years  under 
consideration; 
(e)  the appreciable  weight  of transfers in the aircraft branch 
on  both the expenditure  and  income  side of the  overall 
technological balance  of payments. 
909 FIG.  2 
FRANCE  Aircraft Industry's Technological Balance  of Payments 
(1963-66)  ($thousands) 
Expenditure  Income 
Year  Patents  Techn.  Paaents  Techn. 
and  assist- Total  an 
1  assist- Total 
1"  1  J.cences  ance  licences ance 
1  9 6 3  1,211  725  1,936  n.a.  n.a.  n.Cl. 
1  9  6  4  2.495  2,952  51447  1,492  10,183  11,675 
1  9  6 5  711  9,  715  10,426  1,575  13,520  15.1095 
1  9  6 6  1,197  10,485  11,682  1,035  4,907  5_,942 
1  According  to  the statistics of the  Banque  de  ~ranGe,  t~e figures 
for  licenc~s Qnly  are 8
1~000 (1965)  and  2,160  (1966)  for  expenditure 
and  1,~00  ~1965)  and  Bu  (1966)  for  income. 
Source:  Economies  et Societes,  Politique  de  la Science et Ecart 
Technologique,  No.  4,  April 1969. 
FIG.  3  Aircraft Industry's Technological Balance  of Payments,  Net 
Profit/Deficit by  Items  (1964-66)  ($thousands) 
Patents  Tec:Q.n. 
Year  and  ass  1st- Total 
licences ance 
1  9  6  4  -1,003  +7,231  +6,228 
1  9 6 5  +864  +3,805  +4,669 
1  9 6 6  -162  -s,s78  -5,740 
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 FIG.  5  ~ 
Year 
1 9 6 3 
1 9 6  4 
1 9 6 5 
1 9 6 6 
1 9 6 3 
1 9 6  4 
1 9 6 5 
1 9 6  6 
Aircraft Industry's Technological Balance  of Payments, 
by Countries  (1964-66) 
us  UK  GERMANY  NL  BELGIUI"'\  ITALY'  SVITZER- there 
LAND 
Expenditure  ($thousands) 
859  603  327  - - 8  39  100 
19402  979  2,165  74  70  278  34:S  136 
1,628  1,284  6,132  376  41  416  516  33 
1,255  5,3&0  3,563  235  569  331  57  312 
Income  ($thousands) 
n.d.  n.d.  n.d.  n.d.  n.d.  n.d.  n.d.  n.d. 
7tl>  2,170  7,228  301  3  308  5  955 
771  1,342  10,516  25  140  423  6  1,£r72 
485  3,344  205  284  107  218  3  1,296 
TOTAL 
1,936 
5,447 
10,426 
11,682 
n.d. 
11,675 
15,095 
5}942 
Source:  Econ  mies et So  ietes  Politi ue  de  la Science et Ecart  q  echnolo  ~1,  ue  g  q 
FIG.  6 
Aircraft Industry's Technological Balance  of Payments,  Net 
Profit/Deficit,  by  Countries  (1964-66)  ($thousands) 
EEC 
Year  us  UK  S\fl TZER- Other~  TOTAL 
GERMANY  Nl.  BELGIUM  ITALY  TOTAL  LJ\Nl> 
1 9 6  4  +5 .. 063  +227  -57  +30  +5,253  -697  +1,191  -338  +819  +6,228 
1 9 6 5  +4,384  -351  +99  .. .,  +4,139  -857  +58  -510  +1,839  +4,669 
1 9 6 6  -3,358  +49  -462  -113  -3,884  -770  -2,016  -54  +984  -5,740 
9l2 FIG.  7 
1 
Studies  and Technical  Cooperation in the  Aircraft  Industry, 
Expenditure  and  Income  (1964-66)1 
%of-total-
expenditure 
or  f  Year  GERMANr'  UK  Others  TOTAL 
1n~ome  0r 
studies and 
technical 
cooperation 
Expenditure  ($thousands) 
1  9 6  4  1,580  - 1,580  3,160  5.6 
1  9 6 5  6.420  - 3,320  9,740  14.5 
I 
1  9  6 6  3,560  5,82o  2,ooo  11,380  14.3 
Income  ($thousands)  -
1  9 6  4  7,160  1,840  1,400  10,400  13.0 
1  9  6 5  10,400  - 3,420  13,820  13.6 
1  9  6 6  - 31eso  1,040  4,920  4.5 
Banque  de  France  returns.  The  figures  refer,  under  this 
new  title,  to the  item  HTechnical  Assistance" in the 
statistics previously compiled by  ~he Ministire  de  l'In-
dustrie.  Because  the  methods  of collecting and  compila-
tion are  not  the  same,  the  figures  may  also  show  dif-
ferences;  according to the  source  quoted  below,  the  con-
solidated figures  from  the  Banque  de  France  are  consid-
erably and systematically higher than  the  running totals 
for  expenditure  and  income  under  "Royalties" and  "Tech-
nical Assistance" in the  Ministry's returns because  of 
uncertainties  concerning  the  allocation of data  to 
branches. 
Source:  Economies  et Societes,  Politique  de  la Science 
et Ecart Technologique,  No.  4,  April  1969. 
913 
-United Kingdom 
On  the basis of figures  supplied by  the  Ministry of Techno-
logy,  a  very approximate  reconstruction has attempted of 
payments  received by  the British aircraft industry,  from 
1961  to  1967,  in respect  of royalties and  fees  for  licences 
and  technical assistance  (knowhow). 
No  figures are available  for  the  granting of licences. 
Royal  ties and Fees Paid to British Firms under Licenc:e  Agreements  1 
Branch  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967 
Airframes  560  840  560  280  280  300  320 
Engines  1,120  1,400  1,680  1,400  1,960  2,roo  3,500 
Equipment  560  700  840  800  700  800  840 
T 0  T A l  2,240  2,940  31oao  2,4BO  3,030  4,ooo  4,660 
1  "Redevances" recP~ved.  Source:  SORIS  estimate. 
In  the  case  of airframes,  India is the  main source  of such 
payments. 
The  principal countries  for aeroengines  are  Sweden,  Italy, 
India,  US,  France  and Belgium. 
It was  found  possible  to estimate  outgoing technical pay-
ments,  but,  since very  few  licences  were  acquired2,  it 
would  appear likely that there  was  an  almost  continuous 
surplus  on  this account  over the period. 
2  For  helicopters and a  few  engine  projects  (e.g., 
Continental and  Gnome). 
914 United States 
For  the  United States  no  figures  are available  for  the  techno-
logical balance  of payments  in the  aerospace  field. 
Ir.  the  abs~nce of  such  data,  it is not  possible  to use  trans-
fers  of scientific and  technical knowhow  to other countries 
to  evaluate  the effect of  American  investment  in R&D  and  thus 
to  demonstrate  once  again  the  technological  gap  between  the 
United States and  the  countries  of Europe. 
Nevertheless,  examination  of all the  licence and assistance 
agreements  concluded  between  American  and  European  firms1 
gives  some  idea of the  amount  of money  moving  in each direc-
tion and  of the  exchanges  which  such agreements  generated in 
favour  of the  United States. 
Taking  only the F-104G  programme,  carried out  under  American 
construction licence  by  the  aerospace  industries of Germany, 
Italy,  Belgium and  Netherlands,  royalty payments  by  the  four 
collaborating countries  can  be  estimated at a  total of  $20 
million  (5  million  for airframes  and  15  million for  engines). 
3.  SHARE  OF  TECHNICAL  AND  FINANCIAL  EXCHANGES  IN  THE  OVERALL 
ACTIVITY  OF  THE  EEC  AEROSPACE  INDUSTRIES 
The  abovementioned lack of complete  data  on  the  technological 
balance  of payments in the aeronautical sector is not  the  only 
reason  why  this total cannot  be  used satisfactorily to assess 
the  full significance of technological  exchanges  and  the as-
sociated transfers of money. 
This balance sheet,  which  uses  uniform  data,  fails to reflect 
1 
See Figs.  9-18. 
915 the  varying  importance  of different agreements,  particularly 
in the  matter of licences. 
Any  judgment  concerning licences should  be  based  on  the  know-
ledge  and experience  which  they  bring to  ind~vidual firms, 
in each separate  case,  and  on  the  effect which  work  under 
licence  may  have,  both  on  the  overall activity of the  licence 
company  (work  load ensured,  standard of output)  and  in relation 
to  the latter's sub-contractors,  in order to assess  the  overall 
impact  on  the aerospace  industry of  the  country in  which  the 
licensee is domiciled. 
We  hence  decided  to  compile  for  each EEC  country a  table 
setting out,  for all firms  in  the  national aerospace  industry, 
details of the  products originally turned  out  and  of their 
technical and  financial  links with  foreign  and  other national 
firms. 
A number  of salient features  may  be  noted  for  each  country. 
France 
All three  branches  (airframes,  engines,  missiles)  turn out  a 
wide  range  of  home-grown  products;  there is a  substantial 
amount  of sub-contracting for  national programmes  and inter-
national cooperation in the  case  of airframes. 
There  are  only a  few  licence agreements  with  American  companies, 
mainly in the  airframes branch. 
There  is a  considerable  amount  of sub-contracting and  work  under 
licence,  in  conjunction with foreign,  mainly  American,  firms. 
There  are  dominant  links with  American  firms  both  for sub-
contracted work  and  licence agreements. 
916 There  is very little home-grown  production;  sub-contracting 
and  construction unuer  licence  predominate,  through links 
with European  and  American  firms. 
Netherlands 
The  leading aircraft  company  both manufactures its own  prod-
ucts and  sub-contracts  work  for  foreign  firms;  it also has 
various  technical  cooperation links. 
In  the  case  of  the  United Kingdom,  the  table  shows  the  large 
number  of licences granted,  mainly  in the  engine  branch. 
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Key 
-. 
(TP) 
(TF) 
(TJ) 
(TS) 
(PE) 
(HE) 
(RJ) 
[ J 
by  Branches,  (Figs.  9-18) 
•  ...  •  )1-
Own  production 
Technical collaboration 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
(L)  - ~ 
-~ 
turboprop 
turbofan 
turbojet 
turbo  shaft 
Licence 
Sub-contracting 
Financial holding 
piston engine 
rocket engine 
ramjet 
number  ordered or produced 
918 FRANCE 
Airframes 
EJ  --.-_ -.  _: 
RF  4  [100]- ............... - ..  (L)  .......... -:-
Oessavll  (&OX) 
-lJ,  ----? Or  941  (prolot, P' J  ..............  (L) .......... -»  l  Me Oonncllj  IUS} 
BREGUET 
Or  1150 --,>lStCBAT ~~ ATLANTIC  [01] 
BAC-. ..... •  •  • )1..  ---~  l'>£.PlC.AU---;:..  JAGUA.q  ~00] 
Ons&auH ..........  >- ............  ,...  CC't:lponcnt·  ~llr<t.GE  111 1  IV 
Fokkcr .......... ->-
:Juwt.y  Rotol  .... (L )  .. )b.  ........ -> airscrews 
...... ->  l Oornier 1- • - >  Alpha  Jet (design) 
CAARP  CP  100  (protot  1pe) 
( Ovrb2n  )  r --:..  (AUS) 
PJeL, .........  (l)  .. >  CP  1310  SUPER  EMERAUDE  (11) -- (l)  .......... I  I Binderj  ((}  ----->- ..... >-
• 
Breguet ....... (l)  .. ~ 
I  ~~)  (~tf 
..........  )>-glider  Or  906  A  ....  :-,..... 
I 
L  .. >  L!ii06i~  (lll'.) 
CENTRE -EST  >  OR  250-25:5  [ 200] 
OR  l1S  (9) 
>  OR  220-221  [11~ 
':>  OR  340-360 
Jodol •  •  •  •  (l) .. ,...  .. - .. - ->- light aircraft 
919 Fig.  9  continued 
Sud-·-·"> 
FIAT ..... I>-
DASSAULT 
r -> ("f"fAJ  (~...;.tz..) 
I 
---~~~  MIRAGE  111  [too]  .............. - .. - (L)  ...... L -:.- I c A c I (AUS) 
-----;::;r~  MIRAGES  [1so] 
MIRAGE  F 1 
---....::>~  MIRAGE  F 2  (protot7pe) 
---~=:;.~  MIRAGE  G (prototypGI) 
---~:;?lt~  MIRAGE  IV  [ 65] 
---~~~  MIRAGE  Ill  .. V  (prototype) 
_ .... ->  (ilUChC7a!I] --;;;...  Beech  F 3  ( design) 
---~>-~  FAN  JET  FALCON  [237]  , FALCON  70  [2o]- -~component~  Israel A.IJ 
HIRONDELLE  (prot.ot.fpe) 
MERCURE (design) 
- •  ..  •  .. >- I  SUD 1----;,...  CONCORDE 
-.-.-:a::a- I  Oorn i er  J ---:;;..  Alpha  Jet  ( design) 
-.  -. -. -.  -.  -. -. ~ .  -.  -.  -.  -.  -. -.  -.  -.  - ·~  '-------'  @:D  (US) 
r .. >  !stark I (Sp) 
I 
EJ 
~  TURBULENT  ............................ (L)  .... - .. L -~ IRollasonj(UK) 
DRUINE  -----=~ 
;.  C~DOR ................................  (L) .......... ->  I  Rolla  son j  (Ui<) 
920 Fig.  9  continued 
Ryan->  Kleber Colombes ..... •>--
HUREL- DUBOJS 
----~~~ flexible-wing gliders 
----:::.- CARAVELLE  components 
Sud  -- .. - ->  ---->  coocORDE  components 
- .. - -> helicopter components 
Dassaul  t ..  - - - - >  --- ·>-- components  FALCON,  MIRAGE  Ill, MIRAGE  IV 
'-----' 
D 
>  0 9  BEBE',  011  [300] 
- . - .  >I  SAN,  cEA  I ~  DR  1oso,  10s1  poo] 
.. • ...  >  I  SAN,  WASSMER!~  0 112,1;) 117 ,D 120 ~20]  .... (l)  .. ill>  I  Aero~Diffusionl (Sp 
Sud ----- - ->  ILATECOERE  1----,.,.  CARAVELLE  CONCORDE  components 
I"" •>  (US) 
I 
TEMPErE,StROCCO  [6~- ...... --- .. - .. - (L) --- .. L  ->  (Canada) 
LJ
RCA  --=-
________ ,_  MJ  5  (prototype) 
-----:;.;:.  MJ  8, 9, 10  (protot.jp··  s.) 
EJ 
----3iz;..,.  BAGI£ERA  ~s] 
921 Fig.  9  continued 
Dassault - - - - •  -~ 
Max  Holste - •••  ~ Fl 
I 
---.-)I>-~  MIRAGE  Ill [6ss] 
- • -. -.  >- I  VFW,  HFB I ~  TRANSAll  [16~ 
Nord 262  ~oo] 
Messer schmitt} 
HFB  _  • )loa. 
Bolkow 
Nord 462  (design) 
___  .::;;:;:..~  Nord 500  (prototype) 
Sud- • - • - • - ·~  SN  GOO  DIPLOMATL(design) 
OI~~ANT (prototype) 
----~  CP  750  (protot7po) 
Fouga  ----->  Potez  94  (protot1pe) 
POTEZ 
PARIS  Ill  (prot.ot/pe) 
Cessna  Nord 
Cessna  - - - •  -(L)- - ••  - - - -~ 
tus  n  n 
49711"'-..>  ~8711 
REIMS  Av.  -----'>  F  172  ~oo] (assembly) 
---=~~  ROCKET  ~o] 
Cessna  - - •••  (L) •••••  - •  -~  •  - - _ ->  F  150  [389 J  (assembly) 
Cessna ---- -(L)-------->  •  -- - -)II>  F  411 
Nord  - - - - •  - - >  - - - - -;:,....  C0111ponen U  Nord  262 
Dassault - - - - -~  ----->  CocaponenU  FAN  JET  FALCON 
922 Fig.  9  continued 
Jodel --::a--
Jodel - -> 
Beechcraft .. - ........ -=-
Sud---:;... 
Dassault .. ;. 
SEEMS  --.:;,.. 
Gardan .... >-
Sud--- )loo-
Oassault .. >--
Sud--->--
Sud 
.O.t100%) 
D 150 MASCARET 
0  140  MOUSQUETAIRE,  ABEILLE 
'---SF_E_RM_A  _  ___.I-----,_  MARQUIS  [33] 
S 2510  ~~TILOPE  (protot1pe) 
SIP A 
----->  c~ooR~  components 
----->  CARAVELLE components 
----->  ALOUETTE  II  components 
-----)1> 
MIRAGE  111  components 
Sud 
~(100%)  [  J 
,----!..:.=::..!-----,  ---.;;::>~  RALL YE,  ST  260  CQ.:MOOORE  98:3 
SOCATA. 
.. ...... ->- HORIZOO  ~7~ PROVENCE  [5~- ........  (L) ......  ::;.....  jSouthernl (AUS} 
_  ...... --=- FAN  JET  FALCON  components 
PRESIDENCE 
- - - - ->- FRELON  components 
923 Fig.  9  continued 
B A C.  - •  - •  - • > 
Fouga 
Matra  - - - .(L) -> 
Westland - •  - • 1  ....._ 
Bolkow  - .•  - • r 
~ i korsky - •  - •  - •  - •  - •  - •••  :;...., 
Sikorsky - - - - - - - -;a=.. 
Oasseult - - - - -~ 
~sche  Airbus - J -:>-
HSA  - •  - •  -
Dassault __ •• -> 
B A C ----.  -> 
Breguet  - - - - -> 
ruo 
EJ 
~ 
?' 
----> 
----> 
;:. 
r-)loo. 
I 
I 
Ca.JCORDE  :-:.. 
I 
~65] 
I 
CARAVELLE  r----
I 
MAGISTER  ~~- - - - - .(L). - - ~:;..... 
I 
I  SOCATAI~  JJP ITER  (J) c::J 
I 
-~~ 
(~  - :-31=-
ALOUETTE  II  ~11~-- ••  \L).-- L,... 
1 F.u.  suJC)  t~l 
!Israel A.l..j(lsr.) 
I  Valmet  {Finl.) 
~ (India) 
~ {Sw) 
I  I  (Nl) 
(<f) 
ALOUETTE Ill ~so] ••••  {L) •••  ->- ~ (India) 
--..;;~.,.  SA  340  - - - - - - - •  - - - - - - >  Westland 
--..:::>.,.  SA  330  [21]  - •  •  - •  •  - •  •  - •  • >  Westland 
--..;;;;..~  LUO ION  (prototype-) 
- • - •> I  ~IESTLAt.ZD I~  WG  13 
... - ->  FALCON  components 
--~>~  AIRBUS  A 300 
- ••  ->win~.ll MIRAGE  IV 
- - - ->  vc  10  & Super  vc  10  components 
--- _,_  ATLANTIC components 
--.:;:;:;..,.  WA  40,  BALADW  ~35] 
~  WA  50  (prototyp~) 
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tlotc:hlclu Brandt  ••  I 
a01kow - •  - .... - • -> 
Sud  - •  - •  - •  - •  - • •> 
SF. REB 
LHC:CCEili  ----i;..  MALAFON 
FRANCE 
fit.. ,, 
MASL!RCA  MISSILES 
.[l. SREGuET 
r-·.;::;..----1-----:~  MASURiA  II  (pro\Olf~JO) 
NATRA 
.... • • ·>  MAfR~C£ 
fl  SJO 
-·-·-·-·-···-·-·-·-·-·-·-·  ... ···-···-···-b- ~ 
tROT ALE 
..... • •>  ~  -~ MARTEt. 
, ___  _.~rocket lau~c_h!~s- .................. ILl· .............. ->  @-;;~ 
'-------J 
NeRO 
---~ 
- -: 
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---~  ~ 
---~ 
--------~  ... 
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-.-. -> 
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. -. -> 
cr  20  EoooJ- .. --....... -........ - tLI· - ........ - - ;- -.:J- [M!"t;;i] 
R 20 
c )0 
I 
(USI  li2ll] <· • • • - • :-·> c:=J 
I 
1
- ->  I  sua 1 
CT  A1  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  (L)  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •> 
Nord  510  (protot.1pe) 
AS  20  (632~ 
AS  30  ~000] 
AS  33 
... -> c::::-...:J  (~-') 
I 
AS  11,  SS  11 
I 
Elsoo§l  - - - - - - - .. - IL)• - - .... - .... r  -> ._I __  _,I (l) 
HARP ON 
AS  12,  SS  12 
MILIH 
HOT 
ROLAND 
'  L •.>  CE:s  Artay  jlu.S) 
M 20-------- .. ----- .. - .. •(L)•- .. --- .. --~  I  SAAil-;  (!> ... ) 
PLUTON 
Subcontracting 
for  SSBS,  MSBS 
MM  39  (design) 
lAC 
Sud  (17"1..(l.Nord (17"1  ~t:CMA  (17XI 
~  $£REB 
S 112  (pro\ot,p•) 
tC§J-· -~{ 
SEPR  ..  :.sos 
...  MSBS 
tillED •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •>- '----su_o __  -~1---- ->  prod~tlon  ssas,  ~o~sas 
928 $ol11\ta• •  •  •  •  ·ILl- • •> 
Sucl ••••••••••  ·> 
Lookhet4 - •  •  •  •  •  .. •  •  •  •  •  •  •  > 
IICIA't  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ~> 
ltll •  •  •  •  •  •  •  IL)  •  .. •  •  •  •  -> 
Morel  -· ... - .•.  ·> 
lrtgutt  •, •, •, •,  -> 
o  ..  atuU 
H.I,A,  IUK), 
vrv  ••• • l· ..... 
Ltokhtocl •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  "' •  •  •  1-> 
O.r11ler •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •> 
llllortk)l'  ., •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  ~ 
•••• •>  C.P  301  $  SMARAGD 
- - - ·>  Bo  208 c  ~7~ 
1- • •  • ->I  NORD I __,.  NORD  462  ldeaign) 
GERMANY 
Airfr•••• 
Sci  10$  lpro~o\fptl- •  • •.  •  •  •  •  • •• ILl •••  -c>  !lotillp  Vtr"\ol )Ius 
1- ••• ->lMer"okle!._,..  helicopters 
\....------' 
~Bi.i13:S0·1 
I  D.  AIRBUS  GMB+  •  •  •  ->~---+- AIRBUS  A 300  1  design) 
DOANIEII 
• • . ·>  compotlent•  F 10. G 
--.  -> 
--- -~ 
Do  324  !design) 
ATLANTIC oo•poneata 
TRANSALL component• 
••• •>  UH  1  0  ~4~ 
t------;-~targe  t  SK  s L 
0. 27  ~7~- - - - ••••  - •  - - - •  - •  •  (L). - ·> I CASA I 
Alph•  Je\ ldeaign) 
.... 
-
Do  28  e~ 
SKYSERVANT  E2s] 
Do  132 (design) 
0. 32  u,  0. 32  K lpre\o\1pu) 
VJ  101  C  (pro\o\rptJ 
••  • •>  oomp011en\'  F  1D4  G 
1- •• •>  I  Vf'W,  Norell ~  TAANSAU 
,..  I Ool'nler  CIO  lrull J  ... 
.... 320  [:so]- •• ---•••  ---••••  -•••  •>  [W!]  ,,, 
. •  •> I f'okktl"l ____,..  '  28 
•• •>  compon~n\\  F 28 
1- • •  •> I HOROl  _...,  Norcl  462  I d ..  ign) 
1- •• ->  cOMponen\• Do  31  I 
'-------<  • • •;>  OOIIPOIItn\111  CH  13$  A 
Lookhooel  •  - - - - - ••••••• ~  IMESSEASCitCITT 
OOIIPotltnh  f'  10. I 
rRANSAL  oo•poneata 
. --·> 
. ---> 
HIS.:.l\J 
ltll - •  - •  - - - •  - •  - ••••  - •.> 
llkolflky •  - - •  - •  •  - ........ -·  •>  • • •>  OMPotltnh CH  1SS  A 
r.c.o.--u o. ... ••• - - - -•• - - • •> 
929 Fig.  12  continued 
lockheed - - - - - - - - •  - - - - - :;.:... 
SECBAT  - ---)Po 
HFB----- -> 
~oeinq - - - - - •  - - - - - - - - -~ 
Bell - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ 
Bolkow  n 
(100%)  <J. 
SlAT  - - - ->  components  F  104  G 
--- -~ 
- •  ..  .-::;>-
--- -::::::---
TRANSALl  components 
r  OASSAUL T,  ----?- MYSTERE  30 
ATLANTIC  components 
- - - ->- components  HFB  320 
- - - ->  components  8  737 
- - - -:::::>  componen t.s  UH  1  0 
Alpavia--- -~ 
A!pavia- •  - .~ EJ
---->-
> 
RF 3,  RF 4  r~ 
RF5 
lockheed - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ 
FIAT  - •  - •> 
Fokker  •  - •> 
FIAT  - - -(l)-~ 
Sikorsky - - - - - -(l)- - - - - -~ 
UAC  (USA) 
26%  ~ 
VN 
930 
- - - ->  components  F  104 G 
--_.;;::>'!llo- I  Nord,  HFB  I~  TRANSALL 
- . - . ~  I  Fokker  ~  F  28 
- • - • .> I  Oorn i er  -::- Do  31 
--__;;:::>~  VAK  191  B  (prototf,>l?) 
---==>"!Jooo  vc  400  tdesign) 
--~>~  VFW  614 
___ ~pares  G91 
--......;::;:?,.  WFG-H2  (prototyp") 
- - - ~ CH  53 A  E3~ GERMANY 
Enginea 
Brist.ol Sidd  .....  (Ll-> 
AVCO  Lyc0:1ing ..........  (L) ........ -~ 
RRIBS ........... •> 
Rolls Royce  ----> 
Rolls Royce  .... (L)> 
BMW 
Rolls Ro)lce ..... •> 
Rolls Royce  - •  - • > 
Rolls Royce  ..  •  ..  • > 
G.E ............................. •.> 
Avco  Lyc011ing- .... - ..  (L) ...... -> 
G.E ................... (L)  ...... -.> 
Nord  ...... ~ 
Rocketdyne  •  •  •  •  - •  •  •  •  •  - •> 
NOTS  •  • -- - .. • •- (L)• •  •  • ·> 
j~~~-1 
HIRTH 
~-----> 
LJ-----> 
-----> 
MAN  l\JRBO 
-·---> 
-.-. -> 
> 
~ 
~ 
:> 
:> 
)o 
-----> 
----->  --------- BMW 
-----> 
(TP)  PTL.  6  (prot.ot.yp•) 
F.IG.  13 
(TPl  PTL  10  (prot.ot.yp•) 
(TFl m  6  (design) 
(P'E)  F  10 A 
ORPHEUS  803 
TS3-I.-11,  T53-l.-13 [sso] 
(APU)  T  112 
SPEY  components 
TYNE 
I  RR/SNECMA I --:;.  RB  207 
(TS)  6012  (protot,p-.") 
(TJ)  8026  (prototype) 
(TSl  6022 
(TF)  RB  153  (protot.1pe) 
(TJ)  RB  145  (prot.ot.ype) 
(TF)  RB  193  (prototype) 
T 64 
GO~  ~00] 
J  79-GE 
r--> 
I 
SO  810  COBRA  100000 - .. - .... - (L.) ...... •  '-·>  .. 
BOLKOW 
MILAN 
:;a  HOT 
:>  ROLAND 
-·-·-> I  NORD I ---;..  KORNORAN  AS  34 
...__a_oo_E_N_SE_E_-Jl- - • • -'>  SIDC:WIN:IER 
931 
(Pak.l 
(I) ITALY 
Airframes 
Connell-Douglas- - - - - - - -> 
Boeing - - - - - - - •  - - - •  - - =--
Lockheed------ - -- - - •  -> 
Republic------------ •>-
FIAT  ••  - - ·>-
Lockheed  -----(L) -----> 
SAC  - •  - • •> 
AERFER  •  - • •> 
Lockheed  - - - - - (L)  - - - - - > 
Sprague  Engng  - - - (L)  - - - - •> 
Lockheed  - - - - - - - - - - - • .>-
AERFER 
Lockheed  (US) 
n(20%} 
AERONAUT I  CA 
MACCHI 
AVIC»>AUTICA 
RIO 
C N  A 
Manzolini 
FIG.  14 
----->  componen~s  DC  9,  OC  10 
- - - - ->  component.'  8  747 
- - - - ->  components  F  104  S 
_____  >  spares  F  84 
- - - - - >  components  G· 91  Y 
- •- • ·.> ~  G 222 
- •  - •  - ;;p.  I  Macchi I ~  AM  3 
A 160  { design) 
1-----~  AL  60  - ----------•- •  \1..) --- - - •>- I  Nortwest. l  ICA.'II) 
MB  326  ~5~ ------- • j-- (L)------>  ~  (AUSJ 
I  -basic trainer  (design) !.. -- (Ll ------>  (S..  Afr) 
-.-. ->  ~~advanced  trainer  (design) 
AM  3  (prototype) 
MB  308  •  - •  - •  •  - - - •  - - - (L) - - - - - ·>  I  G.  81anco I  (ArgentJ 
~---->f3pares  T 33 
----->  G S E 
~---->  components  F  104 G & F  104  S 
-.-. -> 
..----i!oogliders  M-100,  M  200  ~s] 
glider  M 300  (prot.ot.tpe) 
LIBELLULA  (protot.yp•) 
932 Fig.  14 continued 
Bell• - •- •  .. •  (L) .... ----> 
Bell------- (1.)----.  •>-
Bell----...  - (L)---- .. •> 
Bell- - - .. - - - (L)- - - - - - > 
Sikorsky  - - - - (L)- - - - - -> 
Sikorsky  ----(Ll------> 
6oein~- Vertol---- .. ----> 
Aviuilano --Ill  - •> 
Lockheed  (L)------> 
Lockheed  (L)•-••••>-
Lockheed  - - - •  (L~---- .. •> 
Sud  Aviation-----> 
Sud  Aviation---- •>-
Northrop---- (Ll------> 
Nord  Aviation  - (L)  -> 
Flygmal Air Target (SW)-(L)> 
Costruzionl 
Aeronaut i che 
G.  AGUSTA 
+ 
Elicotteri 
Meridional i 
LAVERDA 
AV  lAM lLANO 
FIAT  Aviazlone 
METEOR 
---->  AB  47  [iooo]  ------•----- - (Ll----•>  I  West.land I  (UK) 
---->  AS  204,  A8  205 
----> 
----;,...  A8 "206  JET  RANGER  E  1~ 
---->  SH  30  ~~ 
---->  S  61  R 
A 101  G  ~re-production) 
A 106  (prototype) 
A 109 c ( deaig~) 
---->- CH  47  C CHINOOK 
,_--->  FALCO  ~o] 
SCRICCIOLO  [75] 
---->  F 104 G 
---->  F 104  S  E~ 
---->  TF  104  G 
G 91  Y  ~s] 
G 222  (protot-ype) 
- ....  >  ~----;;..  VAK  191  B 
. >  I  Oassault !- MERCURE 
- • - • >  I  Panavi a I ~  MRCA  75 
---->  C~COROECOmponents 
---->  component'$  SA-321,  SA-330,  SA-340 
---->  NVM  1 
---->  CT  20  ~2] 
P1,  PX  (produdion) 
P2  (protot1 pet) 
----:..- Mi sa di s1.ance  indicator  AS  100 
933 Fig.  14  continued 
Lockheed - - "' - ...  - ...... - ...  -::.-
NARDI 
Hughes - ...  - - - - - - ...  - ... -> 
MacchI  - ...  - ...  - ->-
Officina 
Aeronavall 
FIAT  --- ...  - ... -> 
Lockheed  - - - - - - - - - ->-
I  ·~WIA I 
Lockheed  -> 
Rinaldo Piaggio 
Donnell Ooyglaa .... - •  - ·> 
EJ 
Lockheed  - ...  - ............ - -
FIAT  - ...  - ......... 
Macchi  ...... - - -
~ CJ 
-> 
·> 
L-..;.. 
SIAI-Marcha\ti 
Lockheed  - - - - - - - - - -::. 
FIAT  ........ ---> 
Aviamilano-- (L l-> 
FAA  (CH)  - •  - • - .::;... 
Si lve~craft.  - •  - •> 
----->  oCNDponenU  F  104 
----->  OH6AISOO 
-----::JJo- cCNDponenb  MB  326 
conversion various aircraft 
----->  coaaponent.a  G 91 
-·---> 
.... 
-----> 
-·-·-> 
)lo 
~ 
-----.> 
-----> 
-----> 
-----> 
-----> 
ccSalponen"  F  104 
P 64  Oscar  ~------ • •--- (L) -- ... ->  lAFIC l 
P 66  Oscar  (produ<ti~ 
component.•· F  104  S 
p  166  ~1~ 
PO  808  ~~ 
lFIATl ~  G222 
F 15 PICCHIO 
F  480  COBRA  (prototype) 
cCNDPonent.s  F  104 G,  F  104 S 
cQIIPonent.ti  G 91 T,  G 91 Y 
cCNDponen t s MB  326 
PN  333  ~] 
cCNDponen h  F  104 ~ 
(S • Africa) 
-----> 
cCNDPonents  G 91 Y,  G 222  1---->  lwACO I (US)(assembly) 
I 
.. 
I 
S  205,  S 208  ~  •  •  •  ...... - •  •  •  ...  •  - l. ...  •(L)ll- [AI  SA J (Sp) 
-----.>- SF  260  (production) 
> 
::;;..  S 210  (prototype) 
[£!ill~  G 222 
934 ITALY 
Engines 
General Electric ...  - ..... -- .. -- ... ::;... 
General Electric -- ...... (L)  .... -:.-
Rolls Royce  (B.S.) .... -> 
Rolis Royce  (B.S.)  - ....  > 
General Electric .. - .... - (L)-- -~ 
Turbomeca  .. ·-·-·> 
Turbomeca  ...... - • > 
General Electric .. - .......  (L)  - .. -~ 
General Electric - - - - - (L)  - - - ~ 
General Electric- .... --- ...  ---~ 
Rolls Royce  (B.S.)  - (L)~ 
Rolls Royce  (B.S.)  - - .. JII-
Curtiss Wright - - - - - - - - - - - >-
Rolls Royce  (B.S.)  - (L) ~ 
AVCO-lycoming------ (L)  - •  •)l:oo 
AVCO-lycoming  - - - - - - (l) - - - ~ 
General Elect.r ic  - - - - - - - - - ':.. 
Turbo.eca .. - .......... ~ 
General Electric  .... - - .. - - - .. ~ 
General Electric  -- .. ----- -~ 
ALFA  RCNEO 
FIAT 
PIAGGIO 
FIG  15 
--- -:;.:..  components.  J79-GE-11A &  J79-GE-19 
-----=--
----'lP 
----J!I> 
----3!1> 
---->-
----> 
----=--
----> 
----> 
----.> 
----> 
----~ 
-.- ·~ 
J85-GE-13 
T58-GE-10 
TM-251 
TAA-230 
GNQ.,E  components 
DART  components 
(f'E)  GA 40/A 140 
..!79-GE-11A 
J79-GE-19 
components  ..185-GE-13 
ORPHEUS  803 
component  .. 
component\  ..A)5 
@J~  Viper  600 
•  •  - ->  VIPER  11 
- - - •>  V0.435,  GS0.480 
- - - -~  T53-L-11 & T53-L-13 
- - - - >  components.  JBS-GE-13 
D
AtA  ·----> 
--- _,.... 
----==--
componenh MARBORE  ,  ARTCliSTE,  PALClJSTE 
ccmponent~ J79-GE-19 
component~ J85-GE-13 
METEOR  (PE)  ALFA 
935 ITALY 
MISSILES 
BPO  Nltrochemle  (d) 
50%J1  J150% 
Aerojet Gen.--------- (l)- ->  I  AEROCI£MIE  ~--- -l> 
SEPR  ... -.-·-···> ~ 
Raytheon  .. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ l______________- - - - - ~ 
Contraves  A G  (C~)- - - ~ 
Raytheon  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - >-
Oerlikon  (CH) 
100~ 
.0. 
CONTRAVES 
IT All ANA 
-
-----> 
'-----F-1  A_T __  ....JI- - -- - ~ 
FIAT  IRI  BPO 
!l  J1  41 
I 
SISPRE 
I  : 
SIQ.iE 
936 
FIG  16 
HAWK  power units 
ARF/811 
HAWK  components 
INDIGO  (prototype) 
SEA  KILLER  (pre-production) 
MOS~ITO 
HAWK components 
RIGEL  (prototype) 
VEGA  ( design) \
(
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940 CHAPTER  5 
The role of the aerospace industry in the economy 1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  view  of the  very large  amount  of advanced  technology in-
volved in the  aerospace  industry and  the extent to  which it 
depends  on  other branches  (engineering,  metal-working,  chemi-
cals,  electronics,  etc.),  any  countrv  or group  of countries 
seeking to carry out  major research and  production  programmes 
in the aerospace  must  at the  same  time  consider the  problem 
of raising standards to the  highest possible level in all 
branches,  and thus  stimulating research and  development  over 
a  large part of industry as  a  whole. 
This  process  of stimulating a  large  number  of branches  (the 
aerospace  sector is tied up  with most  branches  of industry) 
takes place  by direct or indirect transfer. 
It is direct  when  scientific and  technological work is pro-
vided or created for subsidiary branches and indirect when 
investment in aerospace  research generates  a  very large number 
of new  products and processes  which will have  a  marked in-
fluence  on  markets  and branches not necessarily linked with 
the aerospace  industry. 
In this chapter an  attempt is made  to  carry out  a  qualitative 
assessment  of the repercussions of aerospace activity.  The 
only  way  to demonstrate  the  technical stimulus  given to the 
various  branches  of industry is to use  examples  from  American 
experience,  just as reference  must  be  made  to  the  United 
States when  considering the  more  general effects of aerospace 
activity on  the  economy  and society as  a  whole. 
Only in the  United States has  the effort been sufficient to 
produce  measurable  results;  and it is only  in certain branches 
and sectors of American  development  work  that these results 
have  produced  qualitative  changes  entitling the  direct and 
indirect effects of aerospace activity to  be  regarded as  one of the  decisive  elements in the present  gap  between  the  United 
States and  the rest of the  world. 
Furthermore,  as  the patterns of economic  and  social development 
in the United States and  Europe  are  comparable,  observations 
relating to the  former  may  be  used to arrive at valid conclu-
sions  for  the latter. 
The  massive  support  given to research in the  US,  and the  de-
termination to pursue  the  most  advanced technical objectives, 
are  no  casual  choice,  nor are  they dictated solely by  power 
strategies. 
The  problem first had to  be  faced  many  years ago,  with refer-
ence  to research for  national defence;  it was  necessary to 
determine  the probable effect of massive  government  support 
for studies and research and the extent to which  the use  of 
public  funds  was  warranted.  The  positive  outcome  of this study 
long ago  convinced the  American authorities of the significance 
of government  backing  for studies,  research and  development 
with respect to the  progress  of the  United States,  and  decided 
them  to act accordingly. 
The  European  governments  have  as yet no  such clear conception 
of the  importance  of government  support  for  major research 
and  development. 
Realization of the  interdependence here  discussed may  perhaps 
convince  them  of the  need  for  a  continuous,  purposful effort 
to narrow,  if not  completely close,  the present gap  between 
the  United States and Europe. 
944 2.  TECHNOLOGICAL  FALLOUT 
Aerospace activity can  produce  six· different  types  of effects, 
occurring  jointly or separately: 
1 •  Stimulation of basic  or applied research. 
2.  Development  of new  processes and  technologies. 
3.  Improvement  of existing products  (quality and reliability). 
4.  Increased availability of new  materials,  laboratories, 
experimental  equipment,  etc. 
5.  Development  of new  products. 
6.  Reduction  of  the  costs of technology-intensive  products 
(e.g.,  integrated circuits,  etc.). 
These  effects may  be  regarded as constituting the  general 
impact  of aerospace activity on  the  whole  of industrial activ-
ity. 
In addition,  they  have  a  varying specific impact  on  individual 
products and  problems,  as  is illustrated by Fig.  1. 
This table  shows  the  branches  of industry and  the  fields  of 
activity in which  the effects produced by aerospace activity 
have  been,  or will be,  the greatest. 
They are: 
(a)  medicine  and  biology; 
(b)  electronics and electricity; 
(c)  mechanical  engineering and materials; 
(d)  chemicals and  propulsive  systems; 
(e)  management  techniques. S
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.
 2.1  Medicine  and  Biology 
Astronauts  on  space  flights are  kept  under  continuous  clinical 
observation and  the  data recorded are  transmitted by  remote 
control to  ground stations. 
When  this system,  i.e., the  remote  transmission of clinical 
data,  has  been  introduced in hospitals, it will become  possible 
to keep  patients under observation  from  a  single centre  and  to 
follow all critical changes  in condition much  more  efficiently 
and  quickly than hitherto. 
Another,  and equally  important  factor  in this development 
process will be  a  reduction in hospital staffs,  which will be 
of great significance in view  of the  ever-increasing difficulty 
of recruiting trained personnel. 
New  diagnostic possibilities are  offered by  miniaturized captive 
probes  which  can  transmit  information  from  inside  the  organs 
under  observation. 
The  degree  of miniaturization achieved with such apparatus is 
one  result of space activities and  opens  up  spectacular thera-
peutic prospects in all directions,  but  more  especially in the 
field of cardiac stimulation,  where  the insertion of such de-
vices into the  thoracic  cavity was  virtually inconceivable 
without reliable and  durable  micro-batteries and  miniature 
components. 
The  highly exacting demands  of space  flight  have  also involved 
the  use  of highly sophisticated personality tests.  The  same 
methods  will find applications in many  other sectors,  more 
especially those  where  the safety and  lives of other people 
may  depend  on  optimum  selection of operators. 
2.2 Electronics and Electricity 
Electronics and electricity have  played a  most  important part 
948 in the  growth  of space activities.  The  guidance  of  space 
vehicles  into the  correct orbit,  the  on-board  power  supply 
and  communications  with  ground stations would all have  been 
impossible  without all the  amazing  progress  which  has  been 
made  in these  fields. 
In return,  however,  space  programmes  have  given,  and are 
giving,  an  enormous  impetus  to  fresh  developments  in electron-
ics and  the  production of  energy.  Many  such indirect effects 
can  be  mentioned  the  most  important  being: 
(a)  Reliability 
Electronic  equipment  aboard  space  vehicles  cannot  be 
adjusted or serviced during  a  mission and  must  be 
capable  of  functioning perfectly and  continuously 
for  periods  which  can  run  into several years  in the 
case  of meteorological and  communication satellites. 
This  requirement  has  enormously increased  the  relia-
bility of  components  and  manufacturers  have  had  to 
undertake  advanced  research  on  production  technique 
and processes,  the  improvement  of materials,  in-
spection methods,  etc. 
The  high reliability thus  achieved is finding,  and 
will continue  to find,  many  more  important applica-
tions in other fields,  such as  computers,  automation, 
remote  control,  etc. 
(b)  Microelectronics 
The  complexity of electronics  systems  continues  to 
increase steadily: 
in 1945  there  were  400  electronic valves  in a 
complex  ground aid set 
- in 1958,  it contained  4,000 transistors 
949 - in 1965,  this had  expanded  to  40,000 active  components. 
This  growing  complexity has  been  made  possible  by  the 
development  of microelectronics,  with  techniques offering 
a  combination  of greater reliability,  smaller size,  lower 
consumption  and  falling costs.  Integrated circuits,  which 
are  of vital importance  from  the  standpoint  of  both in-
dustrial applications  (computers,  etc.)  and  consumer  dura-
bles,  are basically attributable to the  requirements  of 
aerospace  progress and will find increasingly advanced 
applications in more  and  more  fields,  with sensational 
improvements  in the  progress  made  in the  electroncis in-
dustry. 
The  process  of miniaturization is bound  to continue  and 
one  authoritative  American  source  (Standard and Poor's 
Compendium  of  American  Industry)  states,  with reference 
to molecular circuits,  which are  today  regarded as  the 
last stage  in this process:  "  •••  the  estimated possible 
packing  density for  such circuits is 5  •  1012  parts per 
11  cubic  foot  as  compared  with 5  •  10  for  the  human  brain  ••" 
The  degree  of sensitivity now  required of guidance  and 
ground  monitoring apparatus,  which  goes  far beyond  that 
of standard types,  opens  the  way  to  the  general adoption 
of a  very  wide  range  of electronic  techniques  in the 
immediate  future. 
The  same  applies to telemetry and  data  transmission and 
processing. 
(c)  Sources  of electrical energy 
Normal  terrestrial sources  of electricity cannot,  of  course, 
be  used  in space.  As  a  result,  advanced  research has  been 
devoted  to  the  development  of new  sources.  Examples  include 
research and  development  work  on  the  conversion  of solar 
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production  of electricity from  chemical  sources  by 
using  fuel  cells. 
Most  existing space vehicles are  powered  by solar energy 
converted into electricity by  means  of photo-electric 
cells. 
Research is being  conducted with  the  aim  of capturing and 
concentrating solar energy  on  thermodynamic  or  thermionic 
converters. 
Radioisotopes  can  be  used  to obtain nuclear power,  ranging 
from  a  few  watts  to several hundred.  This  new  technology 
can  be  used  to build small automatic generating stations 
for all types  of ground installation in inaccessible areas. 
Fuel cells,  which are already used  for  space  missions,  are 
now  suitable  for  mobile  ground location stations,  for tele-
commu&ications  stations and  for portable  TV  sets. 
Finally,  reference should  be  made  to research  (also stemming 
from  aerospace  work)  into the  properties of gases ionized 
at high temperatures,  or plasmas,  and into electric pro-
pulsion  for  interplanetary travel.  These  studies may  well 
lead to  the  development  of electric power  stations equipped 
with  magnetohydrodynamic  generators  for  the  direct,  high-
yield production of electricity by  interaction between 
ionized gases  and  electromagnetic fields. 
2.3 Engineering and Materials 
In  the  field  of  mechanical  engineering,  aerospace activities 
require ultralight structures and materials  capable  of with-
standing extremely severe ambient  concitions. 
Space  flight  involves  the  production and  ultimate dispersal 
of extremely high kinetic energy. 
This  can  only  be  achieved with new  materials and  fresh 
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ties in other branches  of industry. 
It has also been necessary to  devise  new  methods  of analyzing 
stresses to  ensure  the  optimum  use  of materials. 
So  far,  the effects of this new  potential have  been  only  spo-
radic  (e.g.,  the  use  of the  most  advanced  techniques  to build 
pressure  tanks  for  tanker ships,  the  use  of  new  methods  of 
stress analysis in designing bridges  or  pylons  for  high-tension 
lines),  but in the  near future  we  shall witness  massive-scale 
extension of  aerospace  technology  to  shipbuilding to  give  a 
bigger payload  than at present,  weight  for  weight;  the  use  of 
light,  resilient structures capable  of absorbing high kinetic 
energies will be  extended to automobile  construction to give 
better passenger protection,  and  to the  railways to build 
faster trains,  as  such structures simplify problems  of ac-
celeration and braking. 
The  strength of steels has been raised to  the highest level; 
steels with tensile strengths of up  to 300  kg/mm2  are  now 
used in aeroplane undercarriages  and are suitable  for  many 
other purposes. 
New,  very light,  high-strength metals,  such as titanium and 
beryllium,  have  also been  introduced and  brought  into general 
use.  Notable  progress has  been achieved with the  lubrication 
of roller bearings  used in vacuum  conditions,  and  with paints 
by  the  development  of materials  which  have  a  lifetime several 
times  that of conventional types. 
Full account  must  also be  taken of the  advance  made  as regards 
machining tolerances,  servo-controls and  new  machining  proc-
esses, all of which  stem directly from  aerospace activities 
(e.g.,  chemical milling,  high-energy  deep  drawing,  windings 
of  epoxy  fibres,  diffusion bonding,  etc.). 
952 2.4 Chemicals  and Propulsion 
The  need  for  high-energy fuels  has  led to  a  closer reexamina-
tion of the  nature  of chemical reactions and  to an  extension 
of the  scope  of pressure and  temperature  monitoring.  This  has 
substantially increased the potential of chemical  technologies. 
The  new  methods  of liquefying,  storing and  transporting .gases 
developed  for rocket propellants are  of direct interest to all 
branches  connected with  the  use  of liquefied gases,  such as 
the  petrochemicals industry,  iron and steel,  transport,  etc. 
The  introduction of improved  techniques  and  materials in the 
manufacture  of heat  exchangers  have  led,  and will continue  to 
lead,  to  very substantial savings  on  the  construction of both 
nuclear and  chemical  power stations.  Modern  heat  exchange 
methods  will also  open  up  new  prospects  in the automobile 
industry. 
Lastly,  research into nuclear reactors  for  use  in space  and 
into plasma  motors  should bring about  a  further technical 
revolution in the  not  too  distant  future. 
Work  on  nuclear reactors should result in the  development  of 
light,  high-power reactors,  while  research  on  plasma  motors 
should  open  the  way  to  the  direct generation  of electricity 
from  plasma  without  using turbine generators. 
The  full significance  of plasma  technology will become  ap-
parent  when  scientific knowledge  has  advanced  far  enough to 
permit  the  control of nuclear reactions. 
Current  space  research into plasma  technology is laying the 
theoretical and  practical bases  for  future  applications  of 
this technology in the  energy  branch. 
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One  outstanding,  and possibly the  decisive  factor in major 
aerospace  programmes is the  development  of techniques  for 
managing  such vast undertakings as  the  Apollo  project or 
the  full-scale production of the  Boeing 747.  For the first time 
in industrial history,  it is now  possible  to  complete,  on sched-
ule,  overall programmes  which  mobilize  the  labour and  machinery 
of hundreds,  if not  thousands,  of  firms at  one  and  the  same 
time.  This has  been  made  possible  by  the  development  of entirely 
new  management  techniques and  the  use  of systems  engineering. 
The  best  known  of these  management  techniques is PERT  (Programme 
Evaluation and Review Technique),  which is based  on  a  flow  dia-
gram  of time  sequences.  The  crucial points and events in the 
project are analyzed and  shown  on  a  graph with all their inter-
dependent relationships.  The  time  required to  complete  each 
operation between  crucial points is estimated,  with  a  margin 
of uncertainty,  and fitted into an  optimum  flow  for  the  com-
pletion of the  project. 
The  programme  thus arrived at is monitored  continuously by 
means  of computer  systems,  which display critical paths  con-
tinuously,  show  the  latest dates  for  carrying out activities 
in order to  complete  the  whole  project  on  time  and  calculate 
all uncertainty factors  relating to the  separate  stages of 
the  project. 
Other techniques  have  also been  developed.  They  include  MCX 
(Minimum  Cost Expediting),  which is a  linear parametric  method 
used  to  determine  the  minimum  cost  of  a  project in relation 
to duration. 
CPM  (Critical Path Method),  developed  from  MCX,  is similar 
to PERT. 
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first is used to evaluate existing programmes,  the  second 
generates plans and  programmes.  PERT  generates and  shows all 
the  limits of a  programme;  CPM  generates  a  range  of programmes 
correlated to  the  minimum  cost hypotheses  for  each of  them. 
These  new  management  control systems,  which  were  originally 
introduced to monitor  the  progress and  cost of  work  on  govern-
ment  contacts,  have  now  been  extended to  numerous  other in-
dustrial and  commercial applications,  thus raising the  general 
level of management. 
According to a  report  by  Boos-Allen and Hamilton,  who  were 
members  of  the  team  which  devised the  PERT  system,  81%  of the 
firms  using PERT  in 1959  applied it to government  contracts 
only;  by 1965,  50%  of the  same  firms  were  using the  system for 
purely commerical purposes,  while  a  further  35%  were  using it 
for both  government  contracts and  commercial  work. 
On  this point,  it is of interest to recall the  problems  which 
Boeing had  to  face  when  organizing the  production of the 747. 
In all,  65%  by weight  of this aircraft is handled  by sub-
contractors and 15,000  secondary and tertiary sub-contractors, 
scattered throughout  the  United States and  in other countries. 
The  most  important  problems  in such  a  complex  organization are 
delivery  on  time  and  component  reliability;  such  a  complex 
programme  calls for highly sophisticated and  complex  manage-
ment  systems  and  Boeing,  assisted by  TRW,  worked  out  systems 
for the  new  Everett plant  which  would  guarantee  completion 
of the  programme. 
In an interview with  our research workers,  Boeing stressed 
system management  as  the  most  significant feature  of aerospace 
fallout  over the  whole  industry. 
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programmes  to  the  aircraft industry and  thn  tends  to spread 
increasingly to  other branches,  including the  federal state 
governments,  as  we  shall explain at greater length in the 
second part of this chapter. 
To  sum  up,  technological fallout  from  the  aero~pace industry 
should not  be  regarded as  a  bare list of new  materials or 
processes;  attention should rather be  focussed  on  the  following 
points: 
- there is a  direct or indirect link between aerospace  research 
and production and all technology-intensive  branches  of in-
dustry.  Indeed,  aerospace activity has  stimulated their 
development  and will continue  to  do  so  on  an  increasing 
scale,  and all these  technological advances  (aerospace, 
nuclear,  electronics,  chemicals,  metallurgy,  etc.) will have 
their inevitable impact  on all branches  of the  country's 
industryf 
- the characteristic analytical planning which precedes 
aerospace  programmes is raising American  management  to 
standards  which  cannot  be  matched  by  other countries and 
which,  as  they are  extended to all other branches,  will 
further  widen  the  gap  between  American industry and  that 
of every other country. 
3.  ECONOMIC  FALLOUT 
3.1  Transfer and Application of  Aerospace  Management  Techniques 
to Social and Economic  Problems 
Probably the  most  significant aspect  of the  economic  fallout 
of aerospace  technology is the  transfer of the latter, at 
management  level,  to the  solution of the  most  important 
social and  economic  problems  of contemporary society. 
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is on  a  genuinely large scale,  as in the  United States. 
We  shall try to identify briefly the  characteristics of this 
transfer and  to define  the  improved approach  which it offers 
to the  main social and  economic  problems. 
As  already noted,  systems  management  was  applied fully for  the 
first time  in the  new  form  of aerospace  management.  NASA  and 
DoD  documents  show  that the  development  of a  process  system 
involves the  following stages: 
(a)  definition of the  problem and identification of the 
specific features  of the system and its sub-systems, 
and special features; 
(b)  definition of the correlated actions and events  for  the 
formulation  of sequences  and plans  for  the  management 
programme  and  the relevant  work  programmes; 
(c)  definition of the  characteristics of sub-systems,  their 
development  and compatibility checking; 
(d)  production of sub-systems  and  control analyses; 
(e)  definition of the  integration of sub-systems at system 
level,  and  final test of compatibility; 
(f)  checking of the feasibility of the  system and of all 
correlated actions. 
The  outcome  of this approach is fully integrated processes 
which  can  be  completed quickly and efficiently.  Analyses 
carried out in the United States showed  that almost all 
current federal  or state programmes  for  the  solution of the 
community's  most  important  problems  had  gone  wrong  because 
they were  independently directed and  finalized without ration-
al correlation and a  precise definition of objectives. 
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of overlapping levels of authority,  and the  fact  that admin-
istrative divisions and  the  areas affected by  particular prob-
lems  do  not  coincide,  there is now  a  move  towards setting up 
regional systems  which will be  capable  of solving the  prob-
lems  of  the  new  community  so  formed,  within a  new  legal and 
administrative pattern. 
The  second current line  of action is the introduction of new 
systems  derived  from  aerospace  management  techniques to solve 
the  same  problems efficiently, at the right time  and with 
optimum  use  of financial resources. 
This policy was  adopted to  remedy  the  following defects  ob-
served in existing management  systems: 
(a)  At  federal level 
- No  clear allocation of responsibil1ty for decision-
making  or for establishing linea of  communications 
between  departments,  including inability to define 
relationships,  responsibilities and  degrees  of auto-
nomy  as  between  middle  and  top  management. 
- Inability to identify the best  forms  of organization 
for carrying out  programmes. 
- Lack  of managerial  coordination and  of a  national 
statistical system. 
(b)  At  state level 
Little previous  experience  of long-term planning and 
programming. 
(c)  At  local level 
- Lack  of  communications  between local and  outside  organ-
izations. 
Inability to identify precise  objectives and  to main-
tain a  regular check  on  programmes  started. 
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- Lack  of integration and  coordination between 
programmes. 
- Level  of management  too  low  to  carry  through 
complex,  interrelated programmes. 
In  the light of these  facts,  and in order to avoid being 
overwhelmed  by  the  weight  of the social and  economic  problems 
created by  the  changed structure of urban  communities  (53%  of 
American  citizens are  concentrated  on  0.7%  of the  metropolitan 
territory),  local ann  state authorities and  the  new  regional 
organizations began  to introduce  computers  and  more  sophisti-
cated management  systems  derived directly  from  the aerospace 
industry,  such as  PERT  and  the  new  PPBS  system  (Planning 
Programming  and  Budgeting System). 
New  methods  were  adopted for  compiling statistical returns, 
after which  the  next  problem  was  how  to  make  direct use  of 
the  programming  and  management  experience accumulated by 
aerospace  firms. 
The  first contracts  were  signed in California,  where  the 
Aerojet General Corporation was  commissioned to work  out a 
programme  for  waste  disposal,  the  Space  General Corporation 
a  programme  for preventing and  checking  delinquency  and  crime, 
the  Lockheed Missiles and  Space  Company  a  statistical and 
survey programme  at state level and North  American  Aviation 
a  programme  for an  integrated transport system. 
After these  first experimenta,  the  hardware  of aerospace  firms 
was  used  to deal  with the  following  points: 
1.  Clear and  unambiguous  definition of the  aims  of each new 
programme. 
959 2.  Analysis  of  government  organization in relation to the 
programme  and  determination of the  reorganization measures 
required. 
3.  Close  consideration of all interconnections and  determina-
tion of aims  for integration of  the  programme. 
4.  Determination of all interdependent relationships which 
will assist in achieving the  objectives. 
5.  Optimization of the  programme  as regards  times,  costs and 
results. 
6.  Identification and analysis  of all possible alternatives 
to any  given programme. 
These  refinements  were  necessary  in order to  improve  management 
relations between  clients and experts at a  subsequent  stage,  to 
define  an approach  more  in line with the  substance  of  the  prob-
lems  themselves  and not  involving the  indiscriminate use  of 
aerospace  hardware  alone  and to  introduce  a  terminology closer 
to normal administrative language,  which is not  always  compat-
ible with the special  jargon of aerospace  firms. 
When  these  changes  had been  completed,  the  transfer had an 
enormous  impact  in the  United States,  both as regards  the 
direct adoption of new  aerospace  management  techniques by 
public administrations and as regards  the  conclusion of bigger 
and bigger research and  management  contracts with aerospace 
firms  for public  programmes. 
The  transfer was  effected by imitation or analogy.  A typical 
example  of imitation is PPBS,  the  use  of which  was  transferred 
to  non-mil~tary institutions by  a  mere  executive  order  from 
the  DoD.  The  same  applies to PERT  and  CPM. 
More  sophisticated problems  have  to  be  approached  by analogy; 
for  example,  the  concept  of systems  and sub-systems is applied 
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physiological system and  computer  programming. 
Up  to 1968  (according to the  relevant specialist literature) 
no  public  body,  other than  NASA  or the  defence  agencies,  had 
introduced a  completely integrated management  system,  but 
partial systems are  being established at federal,  state and 
local level with a  view to  improving  management  in the usual 
branches  of administration and  carrying out  new  programmes 
in less usual branches. 
A series of bills have  been tabled in the United States  Con-
gress with the  aim  of institutionalizing these systems  through-
out administration at all levels.  A bill (S  430)  was  recently 
tabled in the  Senate  proposing the allocation of $125  million 
for  the  application of systems analysis and  engineering to the 
study of local and national problems relating to  education, 
unemployment,  social security,  crime,  juvenil delinquency,  at-
mospheric  pollution,  low-cost  housing,  transportation and 
waste  disposal. 
Another bill (S  467)  before  the Senate  proposes  the  creation 
of a  National Commission  to promote  new  management  systems 
at all levels of administration.  In addition,  the Governor 
of North  Carolina has  proposed the  establishment  of a  Federal 
Institute. 
Groups  of experts and  research workers  have  recently asked 
the  federal authorities to promote: 
(a)  transfer of the  new  aerospace  management  techniques  to 
all par~s of the  country,  and  between  government  bodies 
and  industries; 
(b)  the  general application of aerospace  management  systems  to 
public bodies,  in order to  programme  and plan the  use  and restructuring of national resources; 
(c)  identification of the regions least affected by  aerospace 
activities,  known  as  "aerospace  technology depressed 
regions",  with a  view to  making  a  special drive  to trans-
fer and apply the  new  techniques under an integrated pro-
gramme  designed to solve the  following problems:  education, 
transportation,  employment,  building,  social security, 
waste,  noise,  social medicine,  natural resources; 
(d)  generalization of an integrated regional information system 
in support  of a  federal  information system; 
(e)  introduction of quality specifications for regional sub-
systems; 
(f)  creation of regional agencies to centralize all activities 
and responsibilities relating to technical and  budgetary 
planning and  programming. 
As  this  process  of mobilization continues at all levels,  a 
study,  completed  in 1968  by  the  Aerospace  Industries Associa-
tion of America,  lists 100  programmes  selected from  among 
those  for  which aerospace  firms  have  been  called in by public 
bodies;  these  are  not  aerospace  programmes  but relate to the 
following social and  economic  subjects:  management  of environ-
mental resources,  logistic information systems,  use  of new 
materials,  health organization,  oceanology,  sources  of  energy, 
transportation,  city planning. 
It may  be  concluded,  therefore,  that the  transfer of aerospace 
techniques is now  almost  complete  and  that it is providing, 
and will continue to provide,  public authorities in the United 
States with parameters  of efficiency which seriously suggest 
that it will become  virtually impossible  to bridge  the  gap 
which has  been  opened  up  with all other countries,  including Europe,  in all matters relating to administrative action and 
the organization of everyday life. 
3.2 Aerospace  Activity and Economic  Support Policies 
Over  the last few  years  the  American  economy  has  been running 
at an extremely high level. 
Since  government  support  and  intervention has  been  mainly 
directed to the  aerospace  industry over the  period,  the 
reasons  for  this  dynamic  performance  must  be  sought  in the 
aerospace branch.  Although Europe  is not  directly involved 
in aerospace  competition,  a  survey,  however brief,  of the 
effects of aerospace  investment is a  vital guide  to all the 
most  modern  economic  support policies. 
The  amounts  of money  involved have  already been  clearly 
stated in previous  chapters. 
Here  we  shall be  considering the  most  important  qualitative 
aspect of the  matter,  namely,  the  characteristics of the 
cycle  of investment in the aerospace  industry. 
Before  the aerospace  age,  the  economic  cycle  comprising in-
vestment,  mobilization of technical resources  and labour, 
purchase  of materials and  manufacture  of the final product 
was  counted in months. 
The  dominant  economic  pattern of any period is determined by 
the  growth  of industry at that time,  or  more  accurately,  by 
the  cycle  of investment in the  various  branches  of industry. 
In addition,  the  economic  cycle  tends  to  become  identified with 
the specific growth  cycle  of  industry at the  given  time. 
The  shortness  of  the  economic  cycle,  and  consequently short-
term economic policies,  were  dictated by  the  short-term char-
acteristics of the  industrial cycle. The  change  to a  long  cycle  came  with the  growth of the aero-
space  industry and  of branches associated with it (electronics, 
atomic  energy,  etc.)  because of the  time  which elapses between 
the planning of a  project and its completion.  This  cycle is 
now  measured in years if not  decades. 
The  effect of massive  government  support  for such long-term 
programming has  been a  stabilization of the  economic  cycle 
and,  inevitably,  its gearing to a  high rate of economic 
activity. 
With  the  ever-growing importance  of government  spending policy 
in these  technologically advanced branches and  the pursuit of 
increasingly long-term objectives,  this spending has  lessened 
the  significance of short-term fluctuations  and  fluctuations 
in specific branches  of industry,  which still have  a  short 
cycle.  Industries making  consumer  goods  which until a  few 
years ago  were  greatly affected by  short-term cyclical fluc-
tuations  can  now  absorb these  trends  more  easily by aligning 
their investment  programmes  with those  of the  advanced  techno-
logical branches  pursuing long-term policies. 
Today,  the  main effects of the  aerospace  industry on  the 
overall business  cycle in the  United States are as  follows: 
(a)  the aerospace  industry has  become  the  biggest  customer 
for  capital in the  economy; 
(b)  the  long-term planning which is a  feature  of investment 
in the aerospace  industry has  changed  the  traditional 
economic  cycle,  which it is progressively subordinating to 
its own  requirements; 
(c)  these new  requirements of the  aerospace  industry have 
revolutionized the  traditional patterns of government 
spending.  Because  of these  requirements,  government  and 
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timing and  quality. 
Past  experience  indicated that it was  correct  economic policy 
for the  government  to cut  spending during periods  when  private 
investment  was  expanding and vice versa.  The  opposite is now 
the  case  in the United States,  where  government  spending rises 
when  private  investment is expanding,  and both private and 
government  investment in the  advanced  technological branches 
develop  simultaneously and in agreement. 
Since,  moreover,  the  length of  the  economic  cycle  has histori-
cally been  determined  by  investment  factors,  it must  be  ex-
pected that this new  combination of government  and private 
investment will tend to identify the  economic  cycle as  a 
whole  with that of the aerospace  industry,  which is of neces-
sity long. 
A long-term,  programmed  investment  cycle,  which has  a  major 
effect on all national economic activities,  must  inevitably 
stabilize the  whole  economic  cycle at the levels produced  by 
the  volume  of investment. 
Moreover,  the principle  of  progr~mming such  investments pre-
supposes  the  simultaneous long-term programming  of all re-
sources  - capital,  technical,  labour,  etc. 
The  risk that,  over the  long period,  the necessary skilled 
labour may  not  be  available to  carry out  the  integrated multi-
annual  programmes  which are typical of the  aerospace  industry 
involves long-term planning of labour resources at all levels 
(by  the state as regards  education and  by  firms  as regards 
recruitment  and training);  the  labour market  has  to be  sta-
bilized and all available  resources  have  to be  brought  into 
use. Lastly,  competition  from  the aerospace  industry on  the  market 
for  capital and  resources stimulates and promotes  the  growth 
of all branches  of industry,  which naturally have  to offer 
alternative uses  for capital and available resources  which 
are  just as attractive as those  offered by the advanced  techno-
logical industries and  just as well protected from  cyclical 
fluctuations;  otherwise  the branches  concerned will inevitably 
decline  or disappear. 
Obviously this is bound  to lead to long-term planning in all 
branches,  including the oldest-established. 
We  must  now  consider whether Europe,  at its own  level,  has 
been able  to benefit  from  the  new  problems  created by the 
aerospace  age  to work  out  a  long-term policy for eliminating 
cyclical fluctuations,  for planning long-term investments, 
for  gearing spending policies,  and their implementing measures, 
to the  new  problems raised by  the advanced  technological 
branches and  for  programming  technological and labour resources. 
The  reply must  be  in the  negative,  not  merely  because  of the 
sporadic nature  of government  spending in these branches,  but 
also because  there is no  example  of a  forward-looking,  long-
term policy designed to stabilize the  economic  cycle at the 
highest possible level with a  view to  continuous,  programmed 
growth. 
Today there are  two  different worlds  - the United States and 
Europe.  It would  appear that something  completely new  is 
developing in the United States economy,  while  Europe  is 
still struggling and operating within a  precarious  economic 
structure which  may  well prove  obsolete  when  the  problems  to 
be  handled  become  too great  for  the  means  of action. 
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Critical assessment of the results of the survey 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Because  the  aerospace  industry makes  intensive use of many 
kinds  of technology and  because it depends  on other branches, 
its growth stimulates optimum  skills in all branches and en-
courages research and  the  expansion of a  wide  area of indus-
trial activity. 
This process  of stimulating other branches  takes place  through 
direct or indirect transfer. 
The  transfer is direct when  scientific and technological activ-
ities are stimulated or induced in subsidiary branches; it is 
indirect when  investment in aerospace research creates new 
processes and Products  which have  a  major effect on  markets 
and  branches not necessarily linked to the aerospace industry. 
The  technological impetus  given to all branches of industry 
and,  more  generally,  the effects of aerospace activity on  the 
economy  and society as a  whole  are  clearly apparent in the 
United States because  of the scale of the effort made. 
Apart  from  the  technological fallout  from  the aerospace in-
dustry,  reference  must  be  made  to  the latter's impact  on  the 
whole  economy;  basically,  this impact  derives not  so  much  from 
the  quantitative value  of the  branches  concerned as  from  the 
qualitative characteristics of the  business  cycle  of those 
branches. 
In industrial companies,  the  dominant  economic  pattern at each 
stage  of the  system's  development  is closely correlated with 
the  timing of investments in the  various  branches  of industry; 
it therefore  follows  that the  overall economic  cycle  tends to 
become  identified with the specific growth  cycle  of industry at 
the  given point in time. Where  there are certain quantitatively dominant  branches 
(e.g.,  aerospace,  electronics,  etc.)  characterized by  a  long-
term  economic  process  and  by  a  high level of private and 
government  investment,  the  characteristics of the  economy  of 
those  branches  tend to spread progressively to the  economic 
cycle as  a  whole. 
The  fact  that,  for  some  years,  short-term cyclical fluctu-
ations  have  been practically insignificant in the United 
States can  be attributed to the  scope  and  long-term planning 
of  investment  in the  technologically advanced branches and, 
in particular,  in aerospace  and  the associated fields. 
The  result is that a  basically stabilized economic  cycle 
sets in,  developing over long periods at high levels. 
It would  seem  fair to  conclude  our survey  by stating that 
Europe  has so far proved incapable  of taking advantage  of 
the  new  problems  created by  the aerospace  age  either to 
bring about  an irreversible process  of growth and  techno-
logical fallout,  because  of the sporadic and  inadequate 
nature  of government  spending  on  aerospace  R&D  and  produc-
tion,  or to work  out  long-term investment  plans  which are 
geared to the  economic  cycle  of the  technologically advanced 
branches and offer the  opportunity of benefiting  from  the 
consequent  economic  fallout. 
2.  THE  EEC  AEROSPACE  INDUSTRY'S  OUTPUT  AND  MARKETS 
Expressed in terms  of final purchasers,  the  aerospace  market 
in the  EEC  is made  up  as  follows  (in 1967):  63.2%  government 
(military and civil,  including flag carriers and  their as-
sociates)  and  2.3%  private1•  A total of  89%  of  R&D  is fi-
nanced  (1967)  by  the  government  and  11%  by private investment. 
1  The  remaining 34.5%  goes  for  export. 
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industry is controlled directly by  the  government. 
All  the  necessary conditions exist for  the  concerted pro-
gramming  of  investments,  production and  marketing to achieve 
growth  targets set for  the  industry by the  government  itself. 
If,  as is to  be  expected,  the  purpose  of government  inter-
vention  (at both national and  Community  level)  is to raise 
the  European aerospace  industry to  a  level of efficiency 
comparable  to that of the  American  industry,  so that,  after 
a  period of special government  assistance,  the European in-
dustry  could  compete  on  the  international market after pas-
sing the  break-even point as  regards structure and productiv-
ity, all programmes  should then be  directed to achieving that 
purpose. 
Since  this is only possible  with an  unbroken,  optimum  work 
load and  large production runs,  specific decisions  concerning 
the  types  of aircraft needing  R&D,  production and  marketing 
must  be  taken and  implemented  on  the  basis of the  closest 
possible analysis of forecasts  for  the  civil and military 
market  over  the  decade  1970-80.  These  decisions  cannot  and 
must  not  be  unrelated,  but  must  be  compatible  with the  capac-
ities and structures of  the  EEC  aerospace  industry,  and  must 
be  limited in number,  in order to  derive  the  fullest  possible 
benefit  from  the resultant unification and  the  consequent 
hypothesis  of  optimum  production runs. 
Something is being  done  in this direction,  as is demonstrated 
by  the  bilateral and multilateral cooperation programmes 
designed  to satisfy the  many  requirements  which are tending 
to  concentrate  on  a  few  proposed  types;  against this must  be 
set the  cost  of R&D  and  the  limited market  for  each  new  type, 
which,  if not  specifically designed  for  a  large  number  of 
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starts. But  much  has  to and  can still be  done  in this direc-
tion by standardizing at  Community  level at least a  few  types 
for  future  use  in the various  countries. 
Side  by side with this policy of planned decisions,  steps 
can also  be  taken,  through  the possibilities offered by  con-
tracting policy,  to reorganize structures and  increase pro-
ductivity,  both of which are also essential in order  to 
attain full  competitive  power. 
In our view,  however,  government  action should be  directed 
principally to  the  continuous  correlation of supply  capacity, 
programmed  on  the  hypothesis  of  growing  efficiency,  to  the 
potential demand  created and  formed  according to a  pattern 
covering the  two  convergent  trends. 
Modern  programming  methods  and  resources  now  provide all the 
reliability required  for  concerted programming.  The  structure 
of  R&D  is itself geared to this objective; it determines  the 
best apportionment  between research and  development  and 
between basic and applied research,  so  that the  time  required, 
on  technical grounds,  to  complete  any  product is matched  to 
the  growth  of  demand.  Moreover,  expenditure  on  R&D  itself 
acts as  a  regulator during  the inevitable breaks in the pro-
ductive  process. 
The  following  factors  would  appear to  prove  that differing 
elements  can  be  correlated in a  rational programme  and  that 
the  capability exists for  the  coordinated and systematic 
capture  of a  fair share  of  the  market  for aircraft products: 
1.  Government  funds  are  in fact  spent  on aircraft for mili-
tary and  civil requirements  and are  most  unlikely to  be 
cut  off in the  near  future.  The  amount  of such spending 
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proportion of  the  national  produ~t. It will therefore 
merely  be  necessary  to  direct this spending to  the  prob-
lems  created by  the  expansion  of the  productive  sector, 
and  conversely to  gear production to satisfying the 
demand  created by  such  spending,  in a  new  form  of re-
lationship which will leave  narrow  divisions behind and 
will open up  wider prospects and  lead to greater success. 
2.  The  industry also has  the  necessary technological  capa-
bility,  as has  been amply  proved  by  the  brilliant results 
of the  most  recent projects  (Concorde,  Jaguar,  Mirage  G, 
etc.). 
3.  The  European aircraft industry  can  supply all the  basic 
requirements  of the  European  military market  (trainers, 
tactical support  and  interceptor aircraft,  light trans-
ports).  Indeed,  the  planning and  production of advanced 
aircraft of  European origin  (e.g.,  Mirage)  and  the  pro-
duction of very advanced  types  under  licence  (e.g.,  F-104) 
have  given the  industry a  capability which  should  cover 
all requirements  that  can reasonably  be  foreseen  over the 
next  ten years and  have  freed it from  the  need  to acquire 
foreign knowhow. 
Moreover,  the  most  recent project  ~greements,  such as that 
for the  MRCA  75,  relate to  an aircraft which will not  only 
satisfy the  needs  of  the  European military market  but will 
also be  able  to  compete  with types  now  planned  to  meet  the 
same  requirements  in the  United States. 
4.  The  demand  for  civil aircraft is growing rapidly as air 
traffic steadily increases. 
This  growing passenger and  freight traffic is becoming 
increasingly diversified to  cover various requirements 
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hand,  the  supply  of transport,  which is fairly rigid 
because  the  means  available are  not  very  flexible,  is 
incapable  of handling  such  a  diversified demand  econom-
ically. This is the  root  cause  of the  economic  difficul-
ties which  face all airlines at the  moment.  The  solution 
is therefore  to diversify transport  so  that  demand  can  be 
handled  economically.  This  means  that airline fleets  must 
include a  variety of  types  and  models.  Because  of all that 
is involved in the  design and  construction of  new  aircraft, 
it seems  unlikely that  the  American industry is capable  of 
meeting all these  requirements  and  supplying all the  types 
needed  for  optimum  airline operation.  This  offers the 
European  industry an opportunity which,  if taken  up  in 
the  sectors in which it is best qualified and  on  the ap-
propriate scale  (short-haul transports,  STOL,  VTOL,  etc.), 
may  produce  the  market  capability needed  to fulfil the 
industry's growth hypotheses. 
It would,  of  course,  be  incorrect to speak of any relation 
between  supply and  demand  in the  space  sector,  because 
demand  is not  autonomous  but is the result of a  political 
decision. 
Here  coordinated efforts must  be  continued along the  lines 
fully discussed earlier in this report,  in order to  keep 
in touch  with planning and  production problems,  which will 
have  extremely important repercussions in the  years  to  come. 
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The  EEC  aerospace  industry is  today characterized by a  heavy 
concentration of financial resources  and  a  low  to very  low 
concentration of technical resources. 
This situation is an  obstacle  to  the  reduction of costs 
through internal or  external economics  of scale,  to  the 
introduction of more  up-to-date management  methods  and  new 
programming  and  control systems  and to the  achievement  of 
optimum  production runs,  of sufficeint length to benefit 
from  the  economic  effects of  numbers  and  high rates. 
In  our opinion,  two  of  the  basic  elements  in the  concerted 
and purposeful programming  mentioned earlier in our report 
are  determination of an  optimum  technical size for the  EEC 
aerspace  industry,  by  correlating size hypotheses  and  R&D 
and production hypotheses,  and  promotion  of the technical 
concentration,  specialization and rationalization of plant 
at all levels. 
The  same  policy is  just as essential for  the accessories 
industry,  which is at present scattered over large  numbers 
of  competing firms  in each  country,  most  of  them  technically 
dependent  on  the United States. 
In our view,  cooperation between  firms  from  different  coun-
tries is a  sound approach to the  problem of achieving the 
capability to carry through  major  programmes  and  to  optimize 
production runs. 
However,  with  a  view to  improving  the structure of the  in-
dustry as a  whole  and achieving an equitable distribution 
of  work  and  a  fair return,  rationalization will be  necessary 
in the  division of labour to avoid duplication of investments 
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product  and not  the  product  to  the structure. 
Any  attempt  to arrive at an  optimum  structure for  the aero-
space  industry in the  Community  must  allow for  the  fact  that 
at the  moment  there  is no  aeroengine  industry worthy  of the 
name.  It would  therefore  be  extremely risky to embark  on  a 
programme  of investment  in research and  development  without 
at least some  prospect  of  making  the  EEC  independent  in this 
branch. 
The  same  argument  applies  to avionics.  The  policy of pur-
chasing licences,  which  has  been  the  general rule  so far, 
cannot  guarantee  that the  best  type  for  the  specific purpose 
will be  available  when  it is needed. 
Lastly,  when  we  consider the  policy of stimulating the in-
dustry in terms  of efficiency,  the principle  of a  fair dis-
tribution by nationality which has so  far applied  (e.g., 
ESRO  and  ELDO)  in the allocation of orders and  subsidies, 
has  to  be  combined  with that of  competence,  specialization 
and  knowhow  so that  the  measures  adopted will produce  their 
maximum  effect and  there will be  no  pointless back-pedalling. 
4.  SUGGESTED  CHANGES  IN  ORGANIZATION 
It emerges  from  our studies that  some  changes  in organization, 
which  moreover  have  widespread support,  are  needed at  Community 
level to resolve  a  number  of what  in themselves are  only sub-
ordinate problems,  but  have  major implications  for  the  design, 
production and  marketing of aerospace  products. 
(a)  The  contracting policy of member  countries should be  made 
as uniform as possible and  should aim at a  Community 
policy based  on  existing examples  in the  United States. 
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aerospace  products  should  be  aligned and  should  form  the 
basis of  Community  standards,  which should so  far as 
possible  be  compatible  with those in force  on  the  biggest 
export  market  (US),  in order to avoid creating a  further 
drawback  for  the  European industry. 
(c)  Customs  legislation and,  more  important,  customs  regula-
tions should be  simplified and harmonized as between 
member  countries because  they are  now  unsuited for ·an 
industry like the aerospace  industry,  which  depends  on 
sub-contractors  for  components  or semi-finished products 
from  countries both within and outside  the  Community. 
(d)  Incentive policies concerning production for  the  home 
market  in member  countries and  to aid exports  should 
be  standardized as  between these  countries and  should 
lead  on  to  a  common  policy for  the whole  Community. 
5.  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE  EEC  AND  UNITED  KINGDOM  AEROSPACE 
INDUSTRIES 
The  main  features  of the British aerospace  industry have  been 
fully dealt  with  in our report.  Here  we  shall simply stress 
our view that it is today  in a  more  difficult position than 
the  EEC  industry. 
In addition to the  very  low  productivity of the British in-
dustry,  it may  be  noted that  from  1960  to  1967  the  value  of 
output  in the  United Kingdom  rose  by  an  average  of  only 1.7%, 
as  compared  with  11%  in the  Community. 
Furthermore,  taking the total output  of the  three areas  (US, 
UK  and  EEC)  as  a  single  figure,  we  find  that the British in-
dustry  employs  16%  of the  total labour  force  but accounts  for 
only 6.6%  of total output. 
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industry has  too big a  labour  force  for its market  potential 
and that its productivity is so  low that radical restructuring 
may  well  be  essential. 
The  British authorities were  themselves  aware  of this need; 
a  White  Paper  on  the  industry,  published in 1947,  asserted 
the  government's  intention to  cut  the  number  of employees 
to about  150,000 within six years1•  Eighteen years later, 
Lord Plowden2  concluded a  searching analysis of the structure 
and problems  of the  British aircraft industry by  stating the 
opinion that the  industry  should  emerge  smaller but stronger. 
Consequently,  any  close association between  the  EEC  and ·uK 
aerospace  industries would  appear  to  be  out  of the  question 
until radical reorganization has  been  carried out  in the 
United Kingdom;  otherwise  a  large  proportion of the  suggested 
support  for  the aerospace  industry would  inevitably go  to-
wards  covering higher aerospace  costs in the  UK. 
The  foregoing  remarks  apply to  the  airframes  branch;  very 
close  cooperation with  the  British engines branch is still 
necessary because  this is the  main  source  from  which  the  EEC 
aerospace  industry can  obtain the  knowhow  required to  develop 
its own  aeroengine  industry. 
1 
2 
The  cuts  were  not  made,  however,  because  of opposition 
and  because  chance  factors  (Korean  war)  brought  about 
a  temporary revival of the  industry. 
"Report  of  the  Committee  of Inquiry into the  Aircraft 
Industry" appointed  by  the  Minister of Aviation under 
the  chairmanship  of Lord  Plowden,  1964-65. 
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